The European Commission: Composition, Powers, Responsibilities, and Executive Functions

The European Commission: Composition, Powers, Responsibilities, and Executive Functions

Introduction

The European Commission occupies a central position in the constitutional and institutional structure of the European Union. It is the institution primarily responsible for promoting the general interests of the Union, initiating legislative action, supervising the application of EU law, implementing common policies and exercising important executive and administrative functions.

Unlike the European Parliament, which represents European citizens, and the Council of the European Union, which represents the governments of Member States, the Commission is designed to operate independently of national political instructions. Its members are expected to act in the general interest of the European Union as a whole rather than advance the particular interests of the Member States from which they originate.

This independent institutional character is one of the defining features of the EU’s supranational constitutional system. The Commission provides continuity in European governance, develops legislative initiatives, coordinates policy implementation and ensures that the legal obligations established by the Treaties and secondary legislation are respected.

Its responsibilities extend across almost every major field of European integration. It participates in economic governance, competition policy, environmental protection, consumer protection, digital regulation, trade, migration, agriculture, energy, public health and external relations. Its influence is therefore not confined to the preparation of legislation. It also extends to the practical administration and supervision of the Union’s policies.

The Commission’s constitutional position is primarily established by Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), together with relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Article 17 TEU identifies several fundamental responsibilities:

• Promoting the general interest of the Union and taking appropriate initiatives to that end.
• Ensuring the application of the Treaties and measures adopted under them.
• Overseeing the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
• Executing the budget and managing programmes.
• Exercising coordinating, executive and management functions as laid down in the Treaties.
• Representing the Union externally in matters other than the Common Foreign and Security Policy, subject to the Treaty exceptions.
• Initiating the Union’s annual and multiannual programming.

These responsibilities establish the Commission as an institution combining legislative initiative, executive administration, regulatory supervision and institutional coordination.

However, the Commission is not a government in the conventional national constitutional sense. It does not possess general legislative authority, nor does it exercise unlimited executive power. Its competences are conferred by the Treaties and secondary legislation, and its activities are subject to parliamentary, judicial, financial and political accountability.

Understanding the Commission therefore requires examining both its institutional independence and the legal limits governing its powers.

1. The Constitutional and Legal Foundations of the European Commission

1.1. Article 17 TEU: The Commission’s Institutional Position

Article 17 TEU provides the principal constitutional framework for the Commission.

The provision establishes the Commission’s general responsibility to promote the interests of the Union and identifies its principal executive, supervisory and representative functions.

Its institutional position reflects an important distinction between supranational and intergovernmental authority.

The Commission is not intended to operate as a diplomatic conference of national governments. Its members are appointed through a process involving the Member States and the European Parliament, but once appointed, they must act independently.

This requirement distinguishes the Commission from the Council of the European Union, where ministers represent their respective national governments and are authorised to commit them.

The Commission’s independence is necessary because its responsibilities frequently involve examining whether Member States have complied with obligations arising from EU law.

If Commissioners were permitted to receive instructions from their national governments, the Commission’s capacity to supervise compliance impartially could be undermined.

The institutional design therefore seeks to reconcile two elements:

1. National participation in the appointment and composition of the Commission.
2. Independence in the exercise of its Treaty-based responsibilities.

This combination reflects the Commission’s position as an institution serving the Union as a whole.

1.2. The Commission and the Principle of Conferral

The Commission’s authority is subject to the principle of conferral established in Article 5 TEU.

It cannot exercise powers merely because a particular measure would advance European integration or because the Commission considers intervention desirable.

Its actions must have a legal basis in the Treaties or in legislation adopted under them.

For example, the Commission possesses extensive authority in competition policy, but that authority is defined by specific Treaty provisions and secondary legislation. It cannot establish an entirely independent competition regime outside the legal framework created by the Member States.

Similarly, its executive powers must be distinguished from the legislative powers of Parliament and the Council.

The Commission may adopt delegated or implementing acts where authorised by the relevant legal instrument, but it cannot use these mechanisms to assume legislative authority that belongs to the co-legislators.

The principle of conferral therefore establishes the constitutional boundaries of Commission activity.

1.3. The Commission and Institutional Balance

The Commission’s powers must also be understood in the context of institutional balance under Article 13(2) TEU.

The Commission occupies an important position in the legislative process because of its general right of legislative initiative.

Nevertheless, Parliament and the Council exercise legislative authority jointly under the ordinary legislative procedure.

The Commission cannot unilaterally determine the final content of legislation adopted through that procedure.

Likewise, the Commission’s executive responsibilities do not permit it to interfere with the judicial functions of the CJEU or the independent monetary responsibilities of the ECB.

Its authority must be exercised consistently with the powers assigned to other institutions.

Institutional balance therefore prevents the Commission’s central administrative position from becoming a source of unlimited institutional authority.

The constitutional framework can be examined through the Treaty on European Union, Article 17.

2. Composition of the European Commission

The European Commission is organised around a political leadership body known as the College of Commissioners, supported by a permanent administrative structure consisting of specialised departments, officials and technical experts.

This organisation combines political responsibility with professional administration.

The College determines the Commission’s strategic direction and adopts decisions collectively, while the administrative services prepare proposals, conduct technical assessments, implement decisions and provide the expertise necessary for the Commission’s daily work.

2.1. The College of Commissioners

The College of Commissioners consists of the President of the Commission and the other Commissioners, including the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the capacity of Vice-President of the Commission.

The current Commission, serving the 2024–2029 mandate, consists of 27 members, corresponding to the number of EU Member States.

The College includes:

• The President of the European Commission.
• Executive Vice-Presidents.
• The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also serves as a Vice-President.
• Other Commissioners responsible for designated policy portfolios.

Each Commissioner is responsible for a particular policy area or group of related responsibilities.

Portfolios may concern competition, trade, agriculture, environment, climate action, economic affairs, justice, digital policy, internal market, energy, employment, migration and other areas of Union activity.

The precise distribution of responsibilities is determined through the Commission’s internal organisation and may change between mandates.

An important constitutional feature is that Commissioners are not national delegates.

Although each Member State participates in the nomination process and the current College includes one national from each Member State, Commissioners are required to act independently in the general interest of the Union.

The nationality of a Commissioner does not give the corresponding Member State a right to direct that Commissioner’s decisions.

2.2. The Principle of Collective Responsibility

The College operates according to the principle of collective responsibility.

This means that Commission decisions are adopted by the College as a whole, and its members share political responsibility for those decisions.

A Commissioner may be responsible for a particular policy portfolio, but the legal and political authority of the Commission is exercised within the framework of collective decision-making.

The President coordinates the work of the College and establishes its political priorities. Nevertheless, individual Commissioners are not independent institutional authorities equivalent to separate ministers in a national government.

Collective responsibility has several consequences.

First, Commissioners are expected to support decisions adopted by the College.

Second, disagreements concerning individual policy areas must be resolved through the Commission’s internal procedures.

Third, the Commission must present a coherent institutional position when representing the Union or participating in negotiations with other institutions.

This structure protects the unity of the Commission and prevents its policy responsibilities from developing into separate and competing institutional powers.

2.3. The President of the European Commission

The President occupies the leading political and organisational position within the Commission.

The President establishes the Commission’s political guidelines, determines its internal organisation, allocates portfolios and coordinates the activities of the Commissioners.

Under Article 17(6) TEU, the President:

• Defines the guidelines within which the Commission operates.
• Decides upon the internal organisation of the Commission.
• Ensures that the Commission acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body.
• Appoints Vice-Presidents from among the members of the College, except for the High Representative, whose position follows the specific Treaty procedure.
• May request an individual Commissioner to resign.

The President also represents the Commission in relations with other EU institutions and participates in important international and interinstitutional meetings.

The President’s organisational authority is particularly significant because the Commission’s work covers a wide range of policy fields.

Without central coordination, the different departments and portfolios could develop inconsistent approaches or compete for administrative and political priorities.

The President therefore provides strategic leadership while preserving the collective nature of Commission decision-making.

2.4. Executive Vice-Presidents and Vice-Presidents

The Commission may appoint Vice-Presidents to coordinate policy areas and supervise work involving several Commissioners.

Executive Vice-Presidents generally have particularly broad coordinating responsibilities.

They may oversee cross-sectoral priorities, coordinate several policy portfolios and ensure that different departments contribute to common political objectives.

For example, an environmental policy may require coordination between climate action, industrial policy, energy, transport, agriculture and economic affairs.

An Executive Vice-President can provide the political coordination necessary to ensure that these responsibilities are addressed consistently.

The High Representative occupies a special position.

Under Article 18 TEU, the European Council appoints the High Representative with the agreement of the President of the Commission. The High Representative also serves as a Vice-President of the Commission and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council.

This dual institutional position connects the Commission’s external responsibilities with the intergovernmental dimension of the Union’s foreign and security policy.

It is an important example of the EU’s distinctive institutional architecture.

2.5. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

The High Representative has responsibilities established by Articles 18 and 27 TEU.

The office combines several functions:

• Conducting the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
• Contributing proposals to the development of that policy.
• Implementing decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.
• Representing the Union in matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
• Coordinating the external dimensions of the Union’s activities.
• Serving as Vice-President of the European Commission.

The High Representative also assists in ensuring consistency between different areas of the Union’s external action.

This arrangement is constitutionally unusual because it connects an office operating within the Commission with responsibilities arising from the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The High Representative must therefore operate within the institutional rules applicable to both dimensions of the role.

2.6. The Administrative Structure: Directorates-General and Services

The Commission’s political leadership is supported by a substantial administrative organisation.

Its principal administrative departments are known as Directorates-General (DGs).

Each DG is responsible for a particular policy area or administrative function.

Examples include departments dealing with:

• Competition.
• Trade.
• Economic and financial affairs.
• Justice and consumers.
• Environment.
• Climate action.
• Employment and social affairs.
• Internal market and industry.
• Energy.
• Agriculture and rural development.
• Migration and home affairs.
• Communications networks and digital policy.

Directorates-General are headed by Directors-General and employ officials and specialists with relevant legal, economic, scientific and administrative expertise.

They prepare policy documents, legislative proposals, technical assessments, consultations and reports.

They also supervise the implementation of programmes and support the Commissioners responsible for their respective portfolios.

The Commission additionally operates through specialised services, including its Legal Service, Secretariat-General, translation services and internal administrative departments.

The Legal Service provides legal advice and represents the Commission in judicial proceedings where appropriate.

The Secretariat-General coordinates the Commission’s internal work, supports the College and helps ensure consistency between departments.

This administrative structure allows the Commission to function continuously, regardless of changes in its political leadership.

2.7. The Commission’s Political and Administrative Dimensions

The distinction between the College and the administrative services is important.

The College is the political decision-making body.

The administrative services provide professional expertise and execute the administrative work required to prepare and implement its decisions.

This separation helps prevent the political leadership from becoming overwhelmed by the technical complexity of individual policy areas.

It also supports continuity in the administration of EU policies.

A change in the Commission’s political leadership does not ordinarily require the replacement of the entire administrative service.

The Commission therefore combines political direction with a permanent European civil service.

3. Appointment and Formation of the European Commission

The appointment procedure is established primarily by Article 17(7) TEU.

It involves the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the President-elect of the Commission.

The procedure reflects the need to reconcile national participation with democratic legitimacy and institutional independence.

3.1. Election of the Commission President

Following elections to the European Parliament, the European Council proposes a candidate for President of the Commission.

Under Article 17(7) TEU, the European Council must take into account the European Parliament elections and conduct appropriate consultations before making its proposal.

The candidate is elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members.

This is an important distinction: Parliament does not merely approve a candidate selected by national governments. It exercises a formal electoral power.

If the proposed candidate fails to obtain the required majority, the European Council must propose another candidate within the period established by the Treaties.

The procedure connects the Commission’s political leadership to the democratic composition of Parliament.

It also preserves the role of the Member States, whose national leaders participate in the nomination process through the European Council.

3.2. Selection of the Other Commissioners

Once the Commission President has been elected, the process of selecting the remaining members begins.

Member States suggest candidates, while the Council, acting by qualified majority and in agreement with the President-elect, adopts the list of persons proposed for appointment as Commissioners.

The President-elect determines the allocation of responsibilities among the proposed Commissioners.

The nominees must possess the general competence, European commitment and independence required by Article 17(3) TEU.

Their selection is therefore not merely a political distribution of national positions. It is also subject to substantive constitutional requirements.

3.3. Parliamentary Hearings

Commissioner-designates appear before the relevant committees of the European Parliament.

These hearings allow MEPs to examine the candidates’ professional qualifications, policy priorities, institutional understanding and proposed approach to their portfolios.

Parliamentary committees may identify concerns or request further explanations.

The hearings are particularly important because the Commission’s authority extends across policy areas that have significant consequences for European citizens, businesses and national administrations.

They provide an opportunity for democratic scrutiny before the College is approved.

3.4. Approval and Formal Appointment

After the parliamentary hearings, the President-elect presents the proposed College to the European Parliament.

Parliament votes on the Commission as a body through a single vote of consent.

Following parliamentary approval, the European Council formally appoints the Commission by qualified majority.

The Commissioners are appointed for a five-year term corresponding broadly to the parliamentary cycle.

The current College took office on 1 December 2024 and serves the 2024–2029 mandate.

The appointment procedure demonstrates the Commission’s dual constitutional foundation: its members are selected through national and European institutional participation, but their subsequent responsibilities must be exercised independently.

The official appointment process is explained by the European Parliament’s institutional fact sheet on the Commission. European Parliament+1

4. Independence and Legal Status of Commissioners

Independence is one of the most important legal characteristics of the Commission.

The requirement is expressly established in Article 17(3) TEU and developed through Articles 245–247 TFEU.

It protects the Commission’s ability to exercise its responsibilities in the general interest of the Union.

4.1. Independence from National Governments

Article 17(3) TEU requires Commissioners to be completely independent in performing their duties.

They must neither seek nor take instructions from any government or other institution, body, office or entity.

Member States are required to respect this principle and must not attempt to influence Commissioners in the performance of their duties.

This requirement is particularly important in areas involving supervision of national compliance with EU law.

A Commissioner cannot legitimately protect the interests of their country of origin at the expense of the Union’s legal obligations.

Nor can a national government require its Commissioner to oppose a Commission investigation or decision.

The obligation of independence is therefore both institutional and individual.

4.2. Duties of Integrity and Professional Conduct

Article 245 TFEU establishes additional obligations.

Commissioners must respect the duties arising from their office and behave with integrity and discretion.

They must not engage in activities incompatible with their responsibilities.

These obligations continue to apply, where relevant, after their term of office has ended, particularly concerning the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits.

The purpose is to prevent conflicts of interest and preserve public confidence in the Commission’s impartiality.

4.3. Breach of Obligations and Removal

Commissioners may be required to resign or may be compulsorily retired in circumstances provided by the Treaties.

Under Article 247 TFEU, the Court of Justice may declare a Commissioner compulsorily retired or deprived of certain rights to a pension or other benefits if the legal conditions are met.

Proceedings may be initiated by the Council or the Commission.

The President also possesses authority under Article 17(6) TEU to request the resignation of an individual Commissioner.

These provisions establish that independence does not mean immunity from legal responsibility.

Commissioners enjoy protection from improper political instructions, but they remain subject to legal obligations and institutional accountability.

5. The Commission’s Right of Legislative Initiative

One of the Commission’s most influential responsibilities is its general right of legislative initiative.

Article 17(2) TEU provides that Union legislative acts shall be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.

This gives the Commission a central role in determining the legislative agenda of the Union.

However, its role must be distinguished from that of the institutions exercising legislative authority.

The Commission generally proposes legislation; Parliament and the Council adopt it.

5.1. Preparing Legislative Proposals

The development of a Commission proposal is a complex administrative and legal process.

It normally begins with the identification of a policy problem or an objective requiring action at Union level.

The Commission examines the relevant legal framework and considers whether the Union possesses competence to act.

It then assesses possible policy options and their likely consequences.

This may involve:

• Consultation with national authorities.
• Public consultations.
• Expert working groups.
• Economic and legal research.
• Scientific assessments.
• Impact assessments.
• Evaluation of existing legislation.
• Examination of subsidiarity and proportionality.

The purpose is to ensure that legislative proposals are supported by sufficient evidence and are compatible with the Treaties.

5.2. The Commission’s Role in Setting the Legislative Agenda

The Commission’s initiative powers give it substantial influence over the development of EU policy.

By identifying problems, preparing legislative proposals and determining the sequence in which initiatives are presented, it contributes significantly to the Union’s legislative priorities.

Nevertheless, the Commission does not possess an unrestricted monopoly over all forms of legislative initiative.

The Treaties provide exceptions.

For example, Article 76 TFEU allows Member States, or the Commission, to initiate certain measures in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

Other Treaty provisions establish specific arrangements for particular policy areas.

The European Parliament also has a right to request legislative proposals under Article 225 TFEU.

Where Parliament makes such a request, the Commission must inform it of the reasons for not submitting a proposal if it decides not to act.

The distinction is therefore between a general right of initiative and the specific exceptions established by primary EU law.

5.3. Withdrawal and Modification of Proposals

The Commission’s responsibilities do not end when it submits a legislative proposal.

It may modify its proposal within the limits established by the Treaties and applicable procedural rules.

Under Article 293 TFEU, the Commission may alter its proposal while the Council has not acted, subject to the applicable provisions.

The Commission also has a legally recognised ability to withdraw a proposal in circumstances where it considers that the legislative process has altered the proposal in a manner that undermines its objectives or distorts its original purpose.

However, this power is not unlimited.

In its judgment in Council v Commission, Case C-409/13, the Court of Justice examined the Commission’s power to withdraw a legislative proposal and confirmed that the exercise of that power is subject to legal requirements, including the duty to state reasons and respect institutional balance.

The judgment demonstrates that the Commission’s legislative initiative is protected by the Treaties, but cannot be exercised arbitrarily.

5.4. The Commission and the Ordinary Legislative Procedure

Under the ordinary legislative procedure, Parliament and the Council jointly adopt legislation.

The Commission participates throughout the process, providing explanations, technical assistance and, where appropriate, modified proposals.

It may also facilitate negotiations between the co-legislators.

However, it does not become a third co-legislator.

Its role is institutionally distinct from the legislative authority exercised jointly by Parliament and the Council.

This distinction is essential to understanding the Commission’s constitutional position.

6. Executive Functions and Implementation of EU Policies

The Commission is commonly described as the executive arm of the European Union.

However, EU executive authority is distributed among several institutions and between the Union and the Member States.

The Commission performs important executive responsibilities, but it does not exercise all administrative powers within the Union.

6.1. Implementation of Union Policies

Article 17(1) TEU provides that the Commission exercises coordinating, executive and management functions as laid down in the Treaties.

These responsibilities involve translating legislative and political objectives into practical administrative action.

For example, where EU legislation establishes common environmental standards, the Commission may develop implementing measures where authorised, monitor compliance, administer relevant programmes and assess whether the policy is achieving its objectives.

Similarly, in relation to agricultural policy, the Commission supervises the operation of common policy mechanisms, administers certain funding arrangements and adopts measures within the powers granted by the applicable legislation.

Its executive functions therefore connect legislative decisions with their practical implementation.

6.2. The Relationship Between the Commission and National Administrations

The Commission does not ordinarily replace national administrations.

In many areas, EU law is implemented through national legislation, administrative decisions and national regulatory authorities.

Article 291(1) TFEU establishes that Member States must adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding Union acts.

The Commission’s responsibility is to ensure that the implementation of Union law takes place within the legal framework established by the Treaties and the relevant legislation.

Where uniform implementation conditions are required, the Commission may receive implementing powers under Article 291(2) TFEU.

This creates a system of shared administration.

The Union establishes common legal standards, while national administrations perform a substantial part of the practical work.

The Commission supervises the system and exercises specific executive powers where legally authorised.

6.3. Management of EU Programmes

The Commission also manages a wide range of Union programmes.

These may involve research funding, regional development, education, innovation, environmental projects, agricultural support, infrastructure and social policy.

Its responsibilities include preparing programme arrangements, administering funding, monitoring implementation and evaluating results.

Depending on the relevant programme, implementation may be carried out directly by the Commission, through national authorities under shared management, or through other authorised bodies.

The distinction between direct and shared management is particularly important.

Under direct management, the Commission or its authorised services administer the relevant funding.

Under shared management, national or regional authorities play a central role in administering EU funds, while the Commission retains supervisory and financial responsibilities.

This arrangement reflects the multilevel administrative character of the Union.

6.4. Executive Decision-Making and Administrative Discretion

The Commission frequently exercises administrative discretion when implementing EU legislation.

Such discretion may involve assessing technical evidence, determining whether legal conditions are satisfied, evaluating applications for funding or applying regulatory standards to particular circumstances.

However, administrative discretion must remain within the limits of the relevant legislation.

The Commission must respect the principles of legality, proportionality, equal treatment, legal certainty and the duty to state reasons where applicable.

Its administrative decisions may also be subject to judicial review.

The existence of discretion therefore does not create unrestricted executive authority.

It creates a legally bounded capacity to apply general rules to specific administrative circumstances.

7. Delegated Acts and Implementing Acts

The Commission’s authority to adopt delegated and implementing acts is one of the most technically important aspects of its executive and regulatory functions.

These acts allow the Union to maintain detailed and adaptable regulatory frameworks without requiring the co-legislators to adopt a new legislative act for every technical adjustment.

The legal foundations are Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.

Although both mechanisms allow the Commission to adopt non-legislative acts, they serve different constitutional purposes.

7.1. Delegated Acts under Article 290 TFEU

Article 290 TFEU allows Parliament and the Council to delegate to the Commission the power to adopt acts of general application that supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative act.

The delegation must be expressly established in the legislative act.

The basic legislative framework must define:

• The objectives of the delegation.
• Its content.
• Its scope.
• Its duration.

Essential elements of the legislative act cannot be delegated.

This limitation protects the legislative authority of Parliament and the Council.

For example, where legislation establishes a general regulatory framework, the Commission may be authorised to update technical annexes or supplement certain non-essential regulatory details.

However, it cannot use delegated authority to rewrite the fundamental policy choices made by the legislature.

7.2. Parliamentary and Council Supervision

Delegated powers remain subject to institutional control.

Under Article 290 TFEU, Parliament or the Council may revoke the delegation.

They may also object to a delegated act within the period specified by the legislative act.

Where an objection is validly expressed, the delegated act cannot enter into force or ceases to apply in accordance with the applicable procedure.

This arrangement preserves the legislative authority of the co-legislators while allowing the Commission to exercise specialised regulatory powers.

7.3. Implementing Acts under Article 291 TFEU

Implementing acts serve a different purpose.

They are intended to establish uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts.

Where uniform implementation is required, the basic legislative act may confer implementing powers on the Commission.

These acts do not supplement or amend the essential or non-essential elements of the legislative act in the same way as delegated acts.

Instead, they provide the detailed administrative or technical measures necessary to ensure consistent application.

For example, the Commission may adopt implementing rules concerning technical reporting requirements, administrative procedures, databases or common standards required under EU legislation.

7.4. The Comitology System

Implementing powers are generally subject to procedures involving committees composed of representatives of the Member States.

This system is known as comitology.

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 establishes the principal framework for Member State control over the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers.

The two principal procedures are:

The advisory procedure: The committee delivers an opinion on the proposed implementing act. The Commission must take the utmost account of that opinion but retains the decision-making responsibility in accordance with the applicable rules.

The examination procedure: The committee delivers an opinion under voting rules based on qualified majority. Depending on whether the opinion is positive, negative or absent, different legal consequences follow.

The examination procedure is used in particular for implementing acts with more significant implications, including those concerning programmes with substantial effects, the common agricultural policy and other important regulatory areas.

The system allows national administrations to participate in supervising the Commission’s implementation of EU law.

7.5. The Constitutional Difference Between the Two Mechanisms

The distinction can be summarised as follows:

Delegated acts	Implementing acts
Article 290 TFEU	Article 291 TFEU
Supplement or amend non-essential elements of legislation	Establish uniform implementation conditions
Delegation by Parliament and Council	Implementing powers conferred through legally binding Union acts
Parliament and Council may object or revoke delegation	Member State committees generally supervise through comitology
Cannot alter essential elements of the legislative act	Cannot change the basic legislative act

The distinction is constitutionally important because it determines the nature of the authority exercised by the Commission and the form of institutional supervision applicable to it.

The Commission’s official explanation is available in its resource on delegated and implementing acts. European Commission+1

8. The Commission as Guardian of the Treaties

One of the Commission’s most significant constitutional responsibilities is ensuring that EU law is correctly applied.

Article 17(1) TEU establishes its supervisory role, while Articles 258–260 TFEU provide the principal infringement mechanisms.

The Commission acts as the principal institutional supervisor of Member State compliance with Union law.

8.1. Monitoring Compliance

The Commission monitors the application of EU law through several mechanisms.

These include:

• Reviewing national legislation and administrative measures.
• Examining notifications from Member States.
• Monitoring the transposition of directives.
• Analysing complaints submitted by individuals and businesses.
• Assessing information provided by national authorities.
• Investigating possible breaches of EU law.
• Conducting structured dialogue with Member States.

The Commission may identify problems through its own monitoring activities or following information received from external sources.

A complaint submitted by an individual does not automatically establish an infringement, nor does it necessarily require the Commission to initiate formal proceedings.

The Commission retains responsibility for determining whether the available evidence justifies further action.

8.2. Infringement Proceedings under Article 258 TFEU

Where the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under EU law, it may initiate infringement proceedings.

The procedure generally involves three stages.

First: The formal notice.

The Commission sends a formal notice to the Member State, identifying the alleged infringement and requesting observations.

This gives the Member State an opportunity to explain its position and address the concerns.

Second: The reasoned opinion.

If the Commission remains dissatisfied, it may issue a reasoned opinion setting out the alleged breach and specifying what the Member State must do to comply.

The opinion establishes a period within which the Member State is expected to take the necessary measures.

Third: Referral to the Court of Justice.

If the Member State fails to comply with the reasoned opinion, the Commission may refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The Court then examines whether the Member State has breached its obligations.

If an infringement is established, the Member State must take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment.

8.3. Article 260 TFEU: Financial Sanctions

Article 260 TFEU provides mechanisms for addressing continued non-compliance with judgments of the Court.

Where a Member State fails to take the necessary measures to comply with a judgment establishing an infringement, the Commission may bring the matter before the Court again.

The Commission may propose that the Court impose:

• A lump-sum payment.
• A periodic penalty payment.

These financial sanctions are intended to encourage compliance with EU law and prevent Member States from treating judgments of the Court as merely declaratory.

Article 260(3) TFEU also establishes a specific mechanism concerning failures to notify measures transposing a directive adopted under a legislative procedure.

In certain circumstances, the Commission may request financial sanctions at the first referral under Article 258 TFEU.

8.4. Infringements Involving Private Parties and Businesses

The Commission’s enforcement responsibilities are not limited to Member States.

In particular policy areas, it possesses direct enforcement powers concerning companies and other private entities.

Competition law provides a prominent example.

Under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the Commission may investigate conduct involving anti-competitive agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings and abuses of dominant positions.

Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 establishes important procedural and enforcement powers enabling the Commission to investigate infringements and impose fines where the legal requirements are satisfied.

Similarly, the Commission exercises enforcement powers under various internal market and digital regulatory instruments.

These responsibilities must be distinguished from infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, which concern failures by Member States to fulfil obligations under EU law.

8.5. The Relationship Between the Commission and the CJEU

The Commission does not possess final judicial authority in determining whether a Member State has infringed EU law.

It investigates, assesses compliance and may initiate proceedings.

The CJEU determines the legal dispute when the matter is brought before it.

This distinction preserves the separation between administrative supervision and judicial adjudication.

The Commission’s enforcement responsibilities are therefore substantial but remain subject to judicial control.

9. Competition Policy and Regulatory Enforcement

Competition policy is one of the fields in which the Commission exercises particularly significant administrative and enforcement authority.

The legal foundations are principally Articles 101–109 TFEU.

The objective is to protect competitive conditions within the internal market and prevent conduct that undermines the operation of market competition.

9.1. Enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU

Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, subject to the applicable legal conditions and exceptions.

Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the internal market or a substantial part of it.

The Commission investigates suspected infringements and may adopt decisions requiring undertakings to terminate unlawful conduct.

It may also impose fines within the framework established by EU competition law.

These powers are important because competition rules must be applied consistently across the internal market.

9.2. Merger Control

The Commission also exercises merger control powers under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, the EU Merger Regulation.

It examines concentrations with a Union dimension to determine whether they would significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or a substantial part of it.

Depending on the circumstances, the Commission may:

• Declare a concentration compatible with the internal market.
• Approve it subject to commitments.
• Prohibit it where the legal conditions for prohibition are satisfied.

The Commission’s decisions may be challenged before the EU Courts.

9.3. State Aid Control

State aid control is another important aspect of the Commission’s responsibilities.

Article 107 TFEU establishes the general framework for determining whether state support constitutes aid incompatible with the internal market.

Article 108 TFEU gives the Commission supervisory responsibilities concerning existing and proposed aid measures.

The Commission examines whether state support falls within the scope of the Treaty rules and whether it may benefit from an applicable exemption or compatibility justification.

This is particularly important because subsidies and other forms of public support can distort competition between businesses operating in different Member States.

The Commission’s authority in this field demonstrates the relationship between European market integration and supranational regulatory supervision.

9.4. Procedural Guarantees and Judicial Review

The Commission’s competition enforcement powers are accompanied by procedural safeguards.

Undertakings affected by investigations must be afforded the rights established by EU law, including relevant rights of defence and procedural protection.

Commission decisions must comply with the applicable legal requirements and may be challenged before the General Court and, where appropriate, the Court of Justice.

Judicial review is particularly important where decisions involve substantial financial penalties or complex economic assessments.

10. The Commission’s Role in Economic Governance and the Internal Market

The Commission participates in the coordination and supervision of economic policies within the Union.

Its responsibilities arise from several Treaty provisions and secondary legislative instruments.

10.1. Economic Policy Coordination

Under Article 121 TFEU, Member States are required to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and coordinate them within the Council.

The Commission contributes by monitoring economic developments, preparing assessments and making recommendations within the applicable procedures.

It also participates in the European Semester, the annual framework for coordinating economic, fiscal, employment and social policies.

The European Semester allows EU institutions and Member States to assess economic developments and identify potential risks.

The Commission analyses national policy plans and economic conditions and may propose recommendations for consideration and adoption by the Council.

Its role is therefore important, but it does not mean that the Commission directly controls the entire economic policy of each Member State.

10.2. Fiscal Surveillance

The Commission also participates in the application of the EU fiscal framework.

Article 126 TFEU establishes the excessive deficit procedure.

The Commission monitors budgetary developments and examines compliance with the relevant fiscal requirements.

Where it identifies a potential excessive deficit, it may prepare reports and opinions and recommend further action under the Treaty framework.

The Council retains important decision-making responsibilities within the procedure.

The relationship between the Commission and the Council therefore illustrates the division between technical assessment and political decision-making.

10.3. Protection of the Internal Market

The Commission contributes to the development and operation of the internal market.

Its responsibilities include supervising compliance with rules relating to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, as well as competition and harmonisation legislation.

It may investigate national measures that create unjustified obstacles to the internal market and initiate infringement proceedings where the relevant legal conditions are met.

It also develops policy proposals intended to improve market integration and reduce regulatory fragmentation.

The Commission therefore operates both as a policy initiator and as a supervisor of the legal conditions necessary for the functioning of the internal market.

11. Budgetary Responsibilities and Financial Management

The Commission performs important responsibilities in the administration of the EU budget.

Its role is established principally by Article 17 TEU and Articles 310–325 TFEU.

The budgetary framework requires cooperation between the Commission, Parliament and the Council.

11.1. Preparation of the Draft Annual Budget

The Commission prepares the draft annual budget and submits it to Parliament and the Council.

The draft reflects the Union’s financial priorities and the resources necessary to implement its programmes and policies.

The Commission must ensure that the proposed budget respects the applicable financial framework and the principles governing EU expenditure.

Parliament and the Council then participate in the budgetary procedure under Article 314 TFEU.

11.2. Execution of the EU Budget

Article 317 TFEU provides that the Commission implements the budget in cooperation with Member States, in accordance with the principles of sound financial management.

This responsibility includes ensuring that EU resources are used for their legally authorised purposes.

The Commission supervises expenditure, manages programmes and applies financial controls.

It must also take appropriate measures to prevent irregularities and address financial risks.

11.3. Shared Management and National Authorities

A substantial proportion of EU expenditure is implemented through shared management arrangements.

National and regional authorities administer programmes and funding under the relevant EU rules.

The Commission supervises these arrangements and ensures that the financial interests of the Union are protected.

Where irregular expenditure or serious management deficiencies are identified, corrective measures may be required.

These may include financial corrections or the suspension of certain payments, subject to the applicable legal framework.

11.4. Financial Accountability and Discharge

The Commission’s budgetary responsibilities are subject to external audit and political scrutiny.

The European Court of Auditors examines EU revenue and expenditure and produces annual and special reports.

Parliament, acting on a recommendation from the Council, decides whether to grant discharge to the Commission under Article 319 TFEU.

The discharge procedure is an important accountability mechanism because it allows Parliament to assess the Commission’s management of the Union’s financial resources.

The Commission must therefore administer public funds within a framework combining executive responsibility, independent auditing and parliamentary supervision.

12. External Representation and International Relations

The Commission also participates in representing the European Union internationally.

Its role is particularly important in areas where the Union possesses external competence and where the Treaties assign the Commission responsibility for conducting or coordinating international action.

12.1. External Representation

Article 17(1) TEU provides that the Commission represents the Union externally, with the exception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other cases provided for in the Treaties.

This responsibility is exercised alongside the external functions of the European Council President and the High Representative.

The division of responsibilities depends upon the policy area and the legal basis concerned.

The Commission therefore does not possess an exclusive right to represent the Union in every international context.

12.2. Common Commercial Policy

The Common Commercial Policy is one of the most important areas of the Commission’s external activity.

Article 207 TFEU establishes the legal framework for this policy.

The Commission conducts negotiations on international trade agreements under the authorisation and directives established through the relevant institutional procedures.

The Council authorises negotiations and adopts the necessary decisions, while Parliament participates through the consent and information mechanisms provided by the Treaties.

The Commission may negotiate agreements concerning tariffs, trade in goods and services, commercial aspects of intellectual property and other matters falling within the Common Commercial Policy.

Its negotiating authority remains subject to the legal and political framework established by the Treaties.

12.3. International Agreements

Article 218 TFEU establishes the general procedure for negotiating and concluding international agreements.

The Commission normally submits recommendations to the Council, which authorises the opening of negotiations and adopts negotiating directives.

The Commission generally acts as the Union’s negotiator, although the Treaties provide for different arrangements in particular circumstances.

The Council ultimately decides on the conclusion of the agreement, following the applicable parliamentary involvement and other procedural requirements.

This arrangement reflects the institutional distinction between negotiation, political authorisation and formal conclusion.

12.4. The Commission and Development Cooperation

The Commission also participates in the implementation of the Union’s development cooperation and humanitarian assistance policies.

It manages programmes, coordinates funding and works with international organisations, partner countries and other actors.

These activities must comply with the objectives and legal framework established by the Treaties.

The Commission’s external responsibilities therefore combine trade, development, humanitarian assistance and other forms of international cooperation.

13. Regulatory Functions and Policy Development

The Commission’s work extends beyond legislative proposals and the implementation of existing legislation.

It also plays an important role in developing regulatory approaches, preparing policy strategies and coordinating action across different sectors.

13.1. Policy Strategies and Action Plans

The Commission frequently prepares communications, strategies, action plans and policy frameworks.

These documents may identify long-term objectives, propose regulatory reforms and coordinate action between institutions and Member States.

They are important instruments of policy development, although they do not automatically possess the binding legal force of regulations, directives or decisions.

Their legal significance depends on their content, purpose and the Treaty framework governing the relevant policy area.

13.2. Better Regulation and Impact Assessment

The Commission has developed procedures intended to improve the quality of EU legislation.

These include impact assessments, stakeholder consultations, evaluations and regulatory scrutiny.

The purpose is to ensure that proposed measures are supported by evidence and that their likely economic, environmental, social and administrative consequences are considered.

Impact assessments may examine:

• The problem requiring intervention.
• The objectives of the proposed measure.
• Available policy alternatives.
• Expected economic consequences.
• Environmental effects.
• Social implications.
• Administrative costs.
• Consistency with existing EU legislation.

These procedures contribute to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

They also support transparency by making the reasoning behind legislative proposals more accessible.

13.3. Consultation and Stakeholder Participation

The Commission frequently consults businesses, civil society organisations, professional associations, researchers, national administrations and individual citizens.

Consultation enables the Commission to gather information that may not be available through its internal administrative structures.

However, stakeholder participation does not transfer legislative authority to private organisations or interest groups.

The Commission remains responsible for assessing the information received and determining the content of its proposals within the limits of the Treaties.

13.4. Regulatory Supervision in Emerging Policy Areas

The Commission’s regulatory responsibilities have become increasingly significant in areas involving technological and scientific development.

Examples include artificial intelligence, digital markets, cybersecurity, data protection, biotechnology and environmental sustainability.

In these fields, legislation may establish broad regulatory obligations while leaving the Commission responsible for specific implementation, monitoring or technical functions.

This development illustrates the increasing importance of specialised administrative expertise in EU governance.

It also raises questions about transparency, delegated authority, technical discretion and the need for effective judicial supervision.

14. Political, Judicial and Administrative Accountability of the Commission

The Commission possesses substantial institutional authority, but its independence does not mean that it operates without accountability.

The Treaties establish several mechanisms through which its political leadership, administrative decisions and financial activities are supervised.

These mechanisms are essential to maintaining the legitimacy of an institution that exercises considerable influence over European policymaking.

14.1. Accountability to the European Parliament

The Commission is collectively responsible to the European Parliament under Article 17(8) TEU.

This relationship is particularly important because the Commission is not directly elected by European citizens.

Parliament provides an essential democratic mechanism through which the Commission’s political activities are scrutinised.

Its supervisory powers include:

• Examining the Commission’s political priorities and work programme.
• Questioning the President and individual Commissioners.
• Conducting parliamentary debates concerning Commission policies.
• Examining reports submitted by the Commission.
• Requesting information and explanations.
• Establishing committees of inquiry under Article 226 TFEU.
• Adopting a motion of censure under Article 234 TFEU.

Parliament may also invite the Commission President or individual Commissioners to participate in parliamentary proceedings.

These mechanisms allow elected representatives to examine the Commission’s conduct and challenge its policy decisions.

14.2. The Motion of Censure

Article 234 TFEU establishes the procedure through which Parliament may dismiss the Commission collectively.

A motion of censure must satisfy strict procedural and voting requirements.

It must be submitted by at least one tenth of the Members of the European Parliament.

The vote cannot take place until at least three days after the motion has been tabled.

Adoption requires a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the component Members of Parliament.

If the motion succeeds, the members of the Commission must resign collectively, and the High Representative must resign from the duties carried out within the Commission.

The Commission remains in office in a caretaker capacity until a replacement College is appointed under the relevant Treaty procedure.

The motion of censure is an exceptional instrument of parliamentary accountability.

It is important to distinguish it from the possibility of an individual Commissioner being asked to resign by the Commission President under Article 17(6) TEU.

The former concerns collective political responsibility; the latter concerns the internal organisation and leadership of the Commission.

14.3. Judicial Accountability

The Commission is subject to judicial review by the CJEU.

Its acts may be challenged under Article 263 TFEU where they are intended to produce legal effects and the applicable admissibility requirements are satisfied.

The grounds of review include:

• Lack of competence.
• Infringement of essential procedural requirements.
• Infringement of the Treaties or any rule of law relating to their application.
• Misuse of powers.

The Court may annul an unlawful Commission act.

The Commission may also be required to act where the conditions for an action for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU are satisfied.

Furthermore, Article 268 TFEU, together with Article 340 TFEU, provides the basis for actions seeking compensation for damage caused by the Union and its institutions.

These mechanisms ensure that the Commission’s administrative and regulatory activities remain subject to the rule of law.

14.4. Administrative Accountability and Good Administration

The Commission must also comply with general principles of EU administrative law.

These include:

• Legality.
• Proportionality.
• Equal treatment.
• Legal certainty.
• Protection of legitimate expectations.
• Respect for the rights of defence.
• The duty to provide reasons for decisions where required.
• The right to good administration.

Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union recognises the right to good administration.

It includes the right to have affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.

It also includes the right to be heard before an individual measure adversely affecting a person is taken, subject to the applicable legal framework.

These requirements are particularly relevant when the Commission adopts decisions concerning businesses, funding recipients or individuals.

14.5. The European Ombudsman

The European Ombudsman investigates instances of maladministration in the activities of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, subject to the applicable Treaty framework.

Its legal foundation is Article 228 TFEU.

The Ombudsman may examine complaints concerning administrative practices, transparency, access to documents, procedural fairness and other matters relating to maladministration.

The Ombudsman does not replace the CJEU and does not generally annul Commission decisions.

Instead, the office provides an additional mechanism of administrative scrutiny and institutional accountability.

This is particularly important because not every administrative failure necessarily constitutes an infringement of EU law that can be remedied through judicial proceedings.

14.6. Financial Accountability

The Commission’s financial responsibilities are supervised through the budgetary and audit framework.

The European Court of Auditors examines the Union’s financial accounts and evaluates the legality, regularity and sound management of expenditure.

Parliament exercises political oversight through the discharge procedure.

The Commission must also maintain appropriate internal controls and take corrective measures where irregularities are identified.

These mechanisms demonstrate that the Commission’s executive authority is subject to several complementary forms of supervision rather than a single system of accountability.

15. The Commission and the Other EU Institutions

The Commission does not operate independently of the wider institutional system.

Its constitutional position requires continuous cooperation with Parliament, the Council, the European Council, the CJEU and other EU bodies.

The relationships are particularly important because many EU policies involve more than one institutional competence.

15.1. Relationship with the European Parliament

The relationship between the Commission and Parliament combines legislative cooperation and political supervision.

The Commission proposes most legislative acts, while Parliament participates in their adoption through the ordinary legislative procedure.

Parliament also elects the Commission President, approves the College and exercises political control over its activities.

The relationship therefore combines cooperation with accountability.

The Commission must respect Parliament’s legislative authority, while Parliament must respect the Commission’s Treaty-based initiative and executive functions.

15.2. Relationship with the Council of the European Union

The Council represents national governments, while the Commission promotes the general interest of the Union.

The two institutions cooperate closely in legislative and administrative matters.

The Commission submits proposals, provides technical information and participates in negotiations.

The Council adopts legislation jointly with Parliament under the ordinary legislative procedure and exercises additional responsibilities in areas such as economic policy coordination and external relations.

The Commission also assists the Council in implementing certain policy objectives.

However, it cannot replace the Council in matters where the Treaties assign decision-making authority to national ministers.

15.3. Relationship with the European Council

The European Council provides general political direction and priorities for the Union.

The Commission President participates in European Council meetings, allowing the Commission to contribute to strategic political discussions.

The Commission subsequently plays an important role in translating political priorities into policy initiatives and administrative action.

Nevertheless, the European Council cannot simply assume the Commission’s general executive responsibilities.

The two institutions have different constitutional functions.

15.4. Relationship with the Court of Justice

The Commission and the CJEU have a particularly important relationship concerning the enforcement of EU law.

The Commission investigates possible infringements and may bring proceedings against Member States.

The Court determines whether an infringement has occurred.

The Commission must also comply with judgments of the Court and ensure that its own administrative decisions respect EU law.

This relationship illustrates the distinction between executive supervision and judicial authority.

15.5. Relationship with the European Central Bank

The Commission and ECB cooperate in matters concerning economic and financial governance.

However, their institutional responsibilities remain distinct.

The Commission performs economic policy monitoring and coordination functions under the Treaties.

The ECB independently conducts monetary policy for the euro area, with price stability as its primary objective.

The Commission cannot instruct the ECB in the exercise of its monetary policy responsibilities.

This distinction protects the institutional independence established by Article 130 TFEU.

16. Legal Limits on the Commission’s Executive Authority

The Commission’s extensive responsibilities must be understood in the context of the constitutional limits governing EU public authority.

These limitations protect Member State competences, institutional balance, individual rights and the rule of law.

16.1. Limits Arising from the Principle of Conferral

The Commission cannot exercise powers that have not been conferred upon the Union.

Every legally significant action must have an appropriate basis in the Treaties or secondary legislation.

Where the Commission adopts an act without the necessary competence, the measure may be challenged before the EU Courts.

This prevents the gradual expansion of Commission authority through administrative practice alone.

16.2. Limits Arising from Institutional Balance

The Commission must respect the powers assigned to Parliament, the Council, the European Council and the judicial institutions.

For example, it cannot adopt ordinary legislative acts independently merely because it possesses the right of legislative initiative.

Similarly, it cannot use implementing powers to modify essential legislative choices reserved to the legislature.

Institutional balance ensures that the Commission’s central executive position does not undermine the authority of other institutions.

16.3. Subsidiarity and Proportionality

Where the Union acts in areas of shared competence, the Commission must consider whether action at Union level is justified under the principle of subsidiarity.

Under Article 5(3) TEU, Union action is appropriate where the objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States and can be better achieved at Union level because of the scale or effects of the proposed action.

The Commission must also respect proportionality under Article 5(4) TEU.

Its proposals and executive measures must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives pursued.

These principles are particularly relevant when the Commission develops legislation or exercises regulatory discretion.

16.4. Fundamental Rights

The Commission is bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union when exercising its powers within the scope of EU law.

This obligation applies to legislative proposals, administrative decisions, funding arrangements and regulatory enforcement.

For example, Commission investigations and administrative proceedings must respect applicable rights of defence, privacy protections and procedural guarantees.

The Commission cannot justify an infringement of fundamental rights merely by invoking the general objectives of European integration.

16.5. Judicial Review and the Duty to Give Reasons

The Commission must provide reasons for its legally relevant decisions where required by Article 296 TFEU and the applicable legal framework.

The duty to give reasons enables affected persons and institutions to understand the legal and factual basis of a decision.

It also allows the EU Courts to examine whether the Commission has acted lawfully.

A decision based on inadequate reasoning, incorrect legal interpretation or an unlawful exercise of discretion may be subject to judicial review.

The possibility of annulment is therefore an essential safeguard against arbitrary executive action.

17. Important Case Law Concerning the European Commission

The constitutional position of the Commission has developed significantly through the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.

Several judgments are particularly relevant to understanding its legislative initiative, executive powers, enforcement responsibilities and institutional independence.

17.1. Council v Commission, Case C-409/13

This judgment concerns the Commission’s power to withdraw a legislative proposal.

The case examined the relationship between the Commission’s right of initiative and the legislative responsibilities of Parliament and the Council.

The Court recognised that the Commission may withdraw a proposal in circumstances where the legislative process threatens to distort its objectives or undermine its purpose.

However, withdrawal must respect institutional balance and cannot be exercised arbitrarily.

The judgment is important because it demonstrates that the Commission’s right of initiative is not merely an administrative privilege. It forms part of the institutional structure established by the Treaties.

17.2. Meroni v High Authority, Joined Cases 9/56 and 10/56

Although these cases concerned the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, their principles remain important in understanding the limits of delegated authority within the European institutional system.

The Court examined the delegation of powers to external bodies and distinguished between clearly defined executive powers and discretionary powers involving substantial policy judgment.

The judgment established important restrictions on delegating authority where doing so could alter the institutional balance established by the Treaties.

Its relevance extends to the modern Commission’s delegated administrative and regulatory functions.

17.3. Commission v Germany, Case 178/84

This case concerned the Commission’s role in ensuring compliance with EU law and the legal responsibilities of Member States.

It illustrates the importance of the Commission’s supervisory functions and the need to distinguish between obligations imposed on Member States and the institutional mechanisms through which those obligations are enforced.

The wider body of infringement jurisprudence confirms that the Commission’s supervisory responsibilities are essential to maintaining the uniform application of EU law.

17.4. Commission v Italy, Case C-33/90

This judgment is relevant to the enforcement of Member State obligations and the interpretation of infringement proceedings.

It illustrates the principle that Member States cannot rely on internal administrative difficulties to justify failure to comply with obligations imposed by EU law.

The case contributes to understanding the Commission’s role in protecting the effectiveness of Union law through infringement procedures.

17.5. Commission v Council, Case C-28/12

This judgment concerned the conclusion of an international agreement and the institutional division of responsibilities within the Union.

The Court examined the appropriate legal basis and the allocation of institutional authority in the relevant procedure.

The case is important because it illustrates that the Commission’s external responsibilities must be exercised within the Treaty framework and in respect of the powers assigned to the Council and other institutions.

17.6. The Broader Constitutional Significance of the Case Law

Taken together, the jurisprudence demonstrates that the Commission is neither an unrestricted executive authority nor a merely administrative institution.

It possesses significant political, legislative, regulatory and enforcement responsibilities, but each must be exercised within the legal framework established by the Treaties.

The CJEU therefore plays a central role in ensuring that the Commission’s institutional importance remains compatible with the constitutional principles governing European integration.

18. The European Commission in the Contemporary EU Governance System

The Commission’s role has become increasingly complex as European integration has expanded beyond its original economic foundations.

Today, the Commission operates in a regulatory environment involving economic integration, digital transformation, environmental protection, technological innovation, energy security, public health, international trade and geopolitical developments.

This expansion has increased both the technical demands placed upon the institution and the significance of its administrative responsibilities.

18.1. The Expansion of Regulatory Governance

Modern EU governance requires detailed technical regulation in areas that evolve rapidly.

Digital markets, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, financial services and environmental protection are examples of policy fields in which legislative frameworks may require continuing technical implementation and supervision.

The Commission contributes through legislative proposals, regulatory guidance, delegated and implementing acts, administrative supervision and enforcement.

Its ability to obtain and assess specialised knowledge is therefore increasingly important.

18.2. The Relationship Between Political Priorities and Administrative Independence

The Commission must also reconcile political leadership with administrative independence.

Its President establishes strategic priorities and coordinates the College, but the Commission’s administrative services must continue to operate according to legal requirements, professional standards and established procedures.

This distinction is particularly important where regulatory decisions affect individual businesses, public authorities or other private parties.

Political objectives cannot displace the legal obligations governing administrative decision-making.

18.3. The Commission as a Centre of Institutional Continuity

The Commission also provides continuity in the operation of the Union.

Its five-year political mandate is supported by a permanent administrative structure capable of maintaining institutional knowledge, managing long-term programmes and supervising the implementation of legislation.

This continuity is essential in policy fields where projects extend beyond a single political mandate.

The Commission’s institutional importance therefore arises not only from the powers it exercises but also from its ability to connect successive stages of European policymaking.

18.4. The Continuing Challenge of Accountability

As the Commission’s regulatory and executive responsibilities expand, questions concerning democratic legitimacy, transparency and judicial supervision become increasingly important.

The greater the administrative discretion exercised by the Commission, the more significant the safeguards governing its decisions become.

Parliamentary scrutiny, judicial review, financial auditing, public access to documents and the right to good administration collectively ensure that the Commission remains accountable within the European constitutional system.

The challenge is to preserve sufficient executive capacity for effective governance while ensuring that all institutional action remains legally authorised, transparent and subject to appropriate control.

19. Key Takeaways

The European Commission is the principal executive institution of the European Union and plays a central role in legislative initiative, policy implementation, regulatory supervision and enforcement of EU law.

The essential principles can be summarised as follows:

1. Constitutional foundation: Article 17 TEU establishes the Commission’s principal responsibilities and institutional position.

2. Composition: The Commission operates through a College of Commissioners, supported by Directorates-General and specialised administrative services.

3. Appointment: The Commission President is proposed by the European Council and elected by Parliament. The College is subsequently approved by Parliament and formally appointed by the European Council.

4. Independence: Commissioners must act in the general interest of the Union and cannot receive instructions from national governments.

5. Collective responsibility: The College adopts decisions collectively, and Commissioners share responsibility for its institutional decisions.

6. Legislative initiative: The Commission possesses the general right to propose EU legislation, subject to exceptions established by the Treaties.

7. Executive functions: It implements policies, administers programmes and exercises executive responsibilities conferred by primary and secondary EU law.

8. Delegated and implementing acts: Articles 290 and 291 TFEU allow the Commission to exercise specific non-legislative powers under legally defined conditions.

9. Guardian of the Treaties: The Commission supervises the application of EU law and may initiate infringement proceedings against Member States.

10. Competition enforcement: It investigates anti-competitive practices, examines mergers and supervises state aid under the relevant Treaty provisions and legislation.

11. Budgetary responsibilities: It prepares the draft annual budget and implements the adopted budget under Article 317 TFEU.

12. External relations: It represents the Union and negotiates international agreements within the areas of competence assigned to it.

13. Accountability: The Commission is subject to parliamentary supervision, judicial review, financial auditing and administrative scrutiny.

14. Institutional balance: Its powers must be exercised consistently with the competences of Parliament, the Council, the European Council and the CJEU.

Ultimately, the Commission combines political initiative, professional administration and regulatory enforcement within a constitutional framework designed to protect the general interests of the European Union.

20. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

1. What is the European Commission?

The European Commission is the politically independent executive institution of the European Union.

It promotes the general interests of the Union, proposes legislation, supervises the application of EU law, manages policies and programmes, implements the EU budget and performs specific external representation functions.

Its principal legal foundation is Article 17 TEU.

2. How many Commissioners are there?

The current College of Commissioners consists of 27 members, one from each EU Member State, including the President and the High Representative in their respective institutional capacities.

The Lisbon Treaty provides a mechanism under Article 17(5) TEU for determining a smaller College, subject to a unanimous European Council decision. However, the arrangement maintaining one Commissioner per Member State continues to apply.

3. How are Commissioners appointed?

The European Council proposes a candidate for Commission President, taking into account the European Parliament elections.

Parliament elects the President by a majority of its component members.

The other Commissioners are selected through a process involving Member State suggestions, the Council and the President-elect. Following parliamentary hearings and Parliament’s approval of the College as a whole, the European Council formally appoints the Commission.

4. Why must Commissioners be independent?

Commissioners must serve the general interest of the Union rather than represent national governments.

Independence is particularly important because the Commission supervises Member State compliance with EU law and exercises regulatory and executive responsibilities.

Without institutional independence, national governments could potentially influence the Commission’s enforcement decisions.

5. Does the European Commission make EU laws?

The Commission generally proposes legislation but does not ordinarily adopt legislative acts independently.

Under the ordinary legislative procedure, the European Parliament and the Council jointly adopt legislation.

However, the Commission may adopt delegated and implementing acts where authorised under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.

6. What is the difference between delegated and implementing acts?

Delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU supplement or amend non-essential elements of legislative acts.

Implementing acts under Article 291 TFEU establish uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts.

Both are non-legislative acts, but they have different purposes and are subject to different supervisory mechanisms.

7. What does it mean that the Commission is the guardian of the Treaties?

It means that the Commission supervises whether EU law is correctly applied by Member States.

Where it identifies a possible infringement, it may initiate proceedings under Article 258 TFEU.

If the Member State fails to comply with a judgment of the Court, further proceedings and financial sanctions may follow under Article 260 TFEU.

8. Can the European Commission impose fines?

Yes. The Commission possesses enforcement powers in certain regulatory fields.

An important example is competition law, under which it may impose fines for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

It also exercises sanctioning powers under certain other EU regulatory instruments.

Its enforcement decisions remain subject to the applicable procedural safeguards and judicial review.

9. Can the European Parliament dismiss the Commission?

Yes. Under Article 234 TFEU, Parliament may adopt a motion of censure against the Commission.

The required majority is particularly high: two thirds of the votes cast, representing a majority of Parliament’s component members.

If adopted, the motion requires the Commission to resign collectively.

10. Can an individual Commissioner be removed?

The President of the Commission may request an individual Commissioner to resign under Article 17(6) TEU.

Compulsory retirement may also be ordered by the Court of Justice under Article 247 TFEU when the relevant legal conditions are satisfied.

11. Does the Commission control national governments?

No. The Commission does not possess general governmental authority over Member States.

However, it supervises their compliance with obligations arising from EU law and may initiate infringement proceedings where necessary.

Member States retain their own constitutional and administrative institutions and exercise competences that have not been conferred upon the Union.

12. What is the role of the Directorates-General?

Directorates-General are the Commission’s principal administrative departments.

They provide specialised legal, economic, scientific and technical expertise, prepare legislative proposals, support Commissioners and assist in implementing EU policies.

They operate under the political and administrative direction of the Commission.

13. How does the Commission manage the EU budget?

The Commission prepares the draft annual budget and implements the budget adopted by Parliament and the Council.

It manages programmes, supervises expenditure and cooperates with national authorities under shared management arrangements.

Its financial activities are audited by the European Court of Auditors and are subject to parliamentary discharge.

14. What is the relationship between the Commission and the Council?

The Commission generally initiates legislation and performs executive and supervisory functions.

The Council represents national governments and participates in adopting legislation and the budget together with Parliament.

Both institutions cooperate extensively, but their constitutional responsibilities remain distinct.

15. Is the European Commission a European government?

Not in the conventional constitutional sense.

Although it performs important executive functions, it does not possess general governmental authority or comprehensive legislative powers.

Its competences are limited by the Treaties, and executive authority is distributed among EU institutions and national administrations.

The Commission is therefore best understood as a supranational executive and administrative institution within a multilevel constitutional system.

Conclusion

The European Commission is one of the most influential institutions in the European Union because it connects the political objectives of European integration with their legislative, administrative and regulatory implementation.

Its position is distinctive. It is neither a conventional national government nor simply an administrative secretariat serving the Member States. It is a supranational institution entrusted with promoting the general interests of the Union, exercising legislative initiative, implementing policies and supervising compliance with European law.

Its composition reflects this constitutional character. Although Commissioners are appointed through procedures involving the Member States and the European Parliament, they are required to act independently and collectively. The administrative structure supporting them provides the professional expertise and institutional continuity necessary to manage an increasingly complex European legal and regulatory system.

The Commission’s powers are extensive but not unlimited. Its right of legislative initiative does not replace the legislative authority of Parliament and the Council. Its executive functions do not eliminate the implementation responsibilities of Member States. Its supervisory responsibilities do not replace the judicial authority of the Court of Justice. Its regulatory powers remain subject to the principles of conferral, proportionality, institutional balance and fundamental rights.

This combination of authority and limitation is central to understanding the Commission’s constitutional position.

The European Commission is the institutional mechanism through which the general interests of the European Union are translated into legislative initiatives, administrative action, regulatory supervision and the practical enforcement of European law. Its effectiveness depends not on unrestricted executive power, but on the lawful exercise of its responsibilities within the broader constitutional structure of the Union.

21. Primary Legal Sources and Further Reading

The following sources provide the principal legal and institutional foundations for studying the European Commission.

Primary legislation

1. Treaty on European Union – Article 17: The European Commission.
2. Treaty on European Union – Article 18: The High Representative.
3. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Article 234: Motion of Censure.
4. TFEU – Articles 245–247: Obligations and Responsibilities of Commissioners.
5. TFEU – Articles 258–260: Infringement Proceedings.
6. TFEU – Articles 290–291: Delegated and Implementing Acts.
7. TFEU – Articles 310–325: Financial Provisions.
8. Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 – Comitology Procedures.
9. Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 – EU Merger Regulation.
10. Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 – Implementation of Competition Rules.

Official institutional resources

11. European Commission – Organisation and College of Commissioners.
12. European Commission – 2024–2029 Mandate.
13. European Parliament – The European Commission: Fact Sheet.
14. European Commission – Delegated and Implementing Acts.
15. European Commission – Infringement Decisions.
16. European Ombudsman.

Important case law

17. Meroni v High Authority, Joined Cases 9/56 and 10/56 – Limits of delegation of powers and institutional balance.
18. Council v Commission, Case C-409/13 – Commission’s power to withdraw legislative proposals.
19. Commission v Council, Case C-28/12 – Institutional powers and the conclusion of international agreements.