Executive Agencies vs. Independent Agencies

Executive Agencies vs. Independent Agencies

One of the most important distinctions in American administrative law has traditionally been the distinction between executive agencies and independent agencies.

At first glance, the difference appears straightforward.

An executive agency is generally understood to operate under stronger presidential supervision. An independent agency is traditionally understood to have greater insulation from direct presidential control.

But that simple explanation is no longer enough.

The constitutional meaning of agency independence has changed significantly over time. In **2026, the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Slaughter fundamentally altered the legal landscape by holding that Congress may not generally prevent the President from removing officers who exercise executive power. The Court expressly overruled the constitutional foundation of Humphrey’s Executor to the extent that decision permitted such removal restrictions for the Federal Trade Commission.

This makes the distinction between executive and independent agencies one of the most interesting subjects in modern administrative law.

For a broader introduction to the structure and operation of administrative agencies, see Cornell Law School’s Administrative Law materials.

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1. What Is an Executive Agency?

An executive agency is an administrative institution operating within the executive branch and carrying out governmental responsibilities assigned by law.

Examples traditionally include agencies and departments such as:

• the Department of Justice;
• the Department of Defense;
• the Department of State;
• the Department of Labor; and
• numerous executive-branch agencies and administrations.

Executive agencies generally operate within a hierarchical structure.

The basic relationship can be represented as:

Congress → statute → President → agency officials → administration and enforcement

Congress establishes the legal framework.

The President is responsible for executing federal law.

Agency officials assist the President in carrying out those responsibilities.

This structure reflects Article II of the Constitution, which vests executive power in the President and requires the President to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.

The Supreme Court’s 2026 decision in Trump v. Slaughter emphasized precisely this hierarchical conception of executive government. The Court described executive officers as assistants or deputies who exercise authority derived from the President and remain subject to presidential supervision.

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2. What Is an Independent Agency?

Traditionally, an independent agency was an administrative agency designed to operate with some degree of insulation from direct presidential control.

Congress historically created such agencies for areas where it believed regulatory decisions should be somewhat protected from immediate political influence.

Examples traditionally associated with the independent-agency model include:

• the Federal Trade Commission;
• the Securities and Exchange Commission;
• the Federal Communications Commission;
• the National Labor Relations Board; and
• the Federal Reserve Board.

Historically, independent agencies often possessed structural characteristics such as:

• multimember commissions;
• staggered terms;
• bipartisan membership requirements;
• restrictions on presidential removal;
• specialized expertise; and
• some degree of organizational independence.

But there has never been a single feature that universally defines an independent agency.

An agency may have one or several characteristics associated with independence.

This is why the distinction has always been more complicated than simply asking:

“Can the President remove the agency head?”

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3. The Traditional Difference

The traditional distinction can be summarized like this:

Executive Agencies	Independent Agencies
Stronger presidential supervision	Greater historical insulation from presidential control
Usually headed by officials more directly accountable to the President	Often headed by multimember commissions or boards
Traditionally subject to at-will presidential removal	Traditionally associated with for-cause removal protection
Closely integrated into presidential administration	Historically designed to operate with greater independence
Often closely connected to executive policymaking	Often justified by expertise, continuity, and political insulation

This table describes the traditional model.

It does not completely describe current constitutional law.

That distinction is extremely important.

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4. Why Were Independent Agencies Created?

The independent-agency model developed partly from the idea that some governmental functions should not be completely dependent on the political priorities of the President.

Consider financial regulation.

Congress might believe that financial markets require decisions based on:

• technical expertise;
• long-term stability;
• continuity;
• specialized knowledge; and
• resistance to short-term political pressure.

Similarly, Congress might believe that labor regulation, communications regulation, or consumer protection should involve specialized institutional decision-making.

The independent-agency model attempted to create that insulation.

The theory was not necessarily that these agencies should become completely independent of government.

Rather, the idea was that some administrative decisions should be buffered from direct presidential political control.

This created an enduring constitutional tension.

On one side:

Presidential control promotes democratic accountability.

On the other:

Institutional independence may promote expertise, continuity, and impartial administration.

Administrative law has spent much of its history negotiating between these two ideas.

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5. Presidential Accountability

The strongest argument for executive agencies is accountability.

The President is elected nationally.

Voters can evaluate presidential policies.

If the administration performs badly, voters can hold the President politically responsible.

The chain of accountability therefore looks something like:

Voters → President → executive officials → agency administration

The theory is simple:

If the President is responsible for executing federal law, the President must have meaningful authority over the officials who execute it.

Otherwise, responsibility and power could become separated.

The President could be blamed for an agency’s actions while lacking sufficient authority to control the agency.

That is one of the central constitutional concerns underlying the modern removal-power doctrine.

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6. The Argument for Independence

The opposing argument is that not every governmental decision should be subject to immediate presidential political control.

Supporters of agency independence have historically argued that certain functions benefit from:

• technical expertise;
• continuity across administrations;
• professional judgment;
• insulation from electoral cycles;
• bipartisan decision-making; and
• protection against political retaliation.

Imagine a regulatory commission responsible for financial stability.

Its members might need to make decisions whose consequences will not become visible for years.

If every regulatory decision could immediately be reversed whenever presidential political priorities changed, Congress might fear excessive instability.

Independent agencies were therefore sometimes designed to create institutional continuity.

The underlying idea was:

Some forms of government administration may work better when expertise and continuity receive greater weight than direct political supervision.

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7. The Removal Power

The most important legal mechanism in the traditional executive-versus-independent distinction has been the presidential removal power.

Suppose Congress creates an agency and provides that its director may be removed by the President only for:

• inefficiency;
• neglect of duty; or
• malfeasance.

The President could not simply remove the director because the President disagreed with the director’s policy decisions.

That restriction creates a degree of independence.

By contrast, if the President may remove an agency head at will, the official is more directly accountable to the President.

The removal power therefore becomes a mechanism of supervision.

The logic is:

Appointment gives the President influence over who serves.

Removal gives the President continuing control over how executive authority is exercised.

This is why removal restrictions have become so constitutionally important.

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8. Humphrey’s Executor and the Traditional Model

For decades, the central case concerning independent agencies was ** Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935)**.

The case involved a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission who had been removed by President Franklin Roosevelt.

The FTC Act permitted removal only for specified causes.

The Supreme Court upheld the restriction.

The Court characterized the FTC as an institution whose functions were not purely executive and described its work as involving what it called quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions.

That reasoning became the foundation for the traditional constitutional conception of independent agencies.

The basic idea was that Congress could sometimes create administrative bodies whose officers were protected from unrestricted presidential removal.

For decades, this case was central to the distinction between executive and independent agencies.

But that constitutional foundation did not survive intact.

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9. Seila Law and the CFPB

In ** Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020)**, the Supreme Court confronted a different structure.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was headed by a single Director who exercised substantial regulatory and enforcement authority.

The Director was protected by a statutory for-cause removal provision.

The Supreme Court held that this structure violated separation-of-powers principles.

The Court emphasized that the CFPB’s Director possessed substantial executive authority while being insulated from presidential removal.

The decision was significant because it distinguished the CFPB from the traditional multimember commission structure associated with Humphrey’s Executor.

The Court did not yet overrule Humphrey’s Executor.

Instead, it refused to extend the older precedent to this new institutional arrangement.

This was an important warning:

The constitutional law of independent agencies was no longer static.

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10. Free Enterprise Fund and Layers of Protection

Another important case was ** Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2010)**.

The case involved multiple layers of removal protection.

The President could not directly remove members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

The members were removable by the Securities and Exchange Commission only for cause.

And the SEC commissioners themselves possessed removal protection.

The Supreme Court concluded that this arrangement excessively restricted presidential control.

The case demonstrated an important principle:

Congress cannot indefinitely insulate executive officers from presidential supervision by stacking multiple layers of removal protection.

The constitutional concern was not simply whether one official had protection.

It was whether the structure prevented the President from effectively controlling executive officers.

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11. Trump v. Slaughter: The 2026 Turning Point

The modern story reaches a major turning point with ** Trump v. Slaughter (2026)**.

The case concerned the Federal Trade Commission.

The FTC consisted of five commissioners, each serving a seven-year term and historically removable by the President only for specified causes.

President Trump removed two commissioners without identifying statutory cause.

The dispute eventually reached the Supreme Court.

The Court held that the FTC’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers.

The Court reasoned that the FTC exercises executive power and that executive officers must remain subject to presidential control.

Most importantly, the Court concluded that the constitutional reasoning supporting Humphrey’s Executor could no longer be maintained.

The Court stated that whatever remained of Humphrey’s Executor was overruled.

This fundamentally changes how lawyers should understand the phrase “independent agency.”

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12. What Happened to Independent Agencies?

It would be inaccurate to say that independent agencies simply disappeared in 2026.

Congress can still create agencies with different organizational structures.

Agencies can still have:

• commissions;
• boards;
• specialized missions;
• staggered terms;
• professional qualifications;
• bipartisan requirements;
• specialized procedures; and
• other institutional characteristics.

But the constitutional ability of Congress to prevent the President from removing officers who exercise executive power has been dramatically narrowed.

The critical question is therefore no longer simply:

“Is this agency independent?”

Instead, lawyers must ask:

“What power does this agency exercise, and does the Constitution permit Congress to insulate the officials exercising that power from presidential control?”

That is a much more precise question.

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13. Independence Is Now a Spectrum

The old model suggested a binary distinction:

Executive agency

versus

Independent agency

Modern administrative law is better understood as more complicated.

Agencies may possess different degrees of:

• presidential supervision;
• statutory independence;
• appointment constraints;
• removal protection;
• budgetary autonomy;
• bipartisan requirements;
• organizational insulation;
• procedural independence; and
• institutional expertise.

This means that “independence” can describe a degree of institutional insulation, rather than a completely separate constitutional category.

Indeed, scholars have long argued that the supposed binary distinction between executive and independent agencies is misleading because agencies exhibit different combinations of structural characteristics.

After Trump v. Slaughter, that insight becomes even more important.

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14. Executive Agency Does Not Mean Unlimited Presidential Power

It is equally important not to make the opposite mistake.

Saying that an agency is executive does not mean that the President can do anything he wants with it.

The President remains subject to:

• the Constitution;
• federal statutes;
• appropriations laws;
• administrative procedure;
• judicial review;
• statutory limits on agency authority;
• constitutional rights; and
• other legal constraints.

Presidential control is not equivalent to unlimited presidential power.

For example, an executive agency cannot issue a regulation that contradicts the statute Congress enacted simply because the President prefers the regulation.

The agency’s authority remains statutory.

And after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, courts independently interpret statutes rather than automatically deferring to an agency’s interpretation merely because the agency administers the statute. Cornell’s current Wex treatment of administrative law reflects this post-Loper Bright framework.

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15. Independent Does Not Mean Above the Law

The same principle applies to independent agencies.

Even historically independent agencies were never supposed to possess unlimited authority.

They remained subject to:

• congressional statutes;
• constitutional restrictions;
• administrative procedure;
• judicial review;
• due process;
• statutory jurisdiction; and
• reasoned decision-making requirements.

“Independent” therefore never meant:

“Not subject to law.”

It meant something closer to:

“Designed with a greater degree of institutional insulation from direct presidential control.”

That distinction is fundamental.

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16. Executive Agencies and Rulemaking

Both executive and traditionally independent agencies can engage in rulemaking.

Rulemaking allows an agency to develop regulations implementing statutory authority.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, federal rulemaking is governed by procedural requirements that can include notice and an opportunity for public participation. The APA is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 and provides the basic federal framework for rulemaking and adjudication.

Therefore, the difference between executive and independent agencies is not:

Executive agencies make rules; independent agencies do not.

Both may make rules.

The more important question is:

Who controls the officials making those rules, and what statutory authority supports the rules?

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17. Executive Agencies and Enforcement

Both categories may also conduct enforcement.

An agency may:

• investigate;
• issue subpoenas where authorized;
• conduct administrative proceedings;
• seek civil penalties;
• bring enforcement actions in federal court;
• issue administrative orders; or
• impose sanctions authorized by statute.

This matters because enforcement involves the coercive power of government.

The more substantial the executive power exercised by an agency, the more important presidential accountability becomes under the modern constitutional framework.

This was central to the reasoning in Seila Law and Trump v. Slaughter.

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18. Executive Agencies and Administrative Adjudication

Agencies may also conduct administrative adjudications.

Administrative law judges can hear disputes arising within agency programs and regulatory systems.

Importantly, administrative law judges are part of the executive branch rather than Article III courts, even though they perform adjudicatory functions and receive procedural protections intended to preserve impartiality.

This illustrates another important feature of administrative government:

An agency may perform functions that resemble several different branches of government without becoming an independent constitutional branch.

An agency may:

• make rules;
• enforce rules; and
• adjudicate disputes.

Yet it remains part of a governmental system ultimately structured by the Constitution and federal statutes.

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19. Expertise vs. Accountability

The executive-versus-independent-agency debate reflects a deeper philosophical conflict.

Expertise

Administrative agencies exist partly because modern government involves technical problems that Congress cannot solve in detailed statutory language alone.

Agencies may employ:

• economists;
• scientists;
• engineers;
• lawyers;
• financial specialists;
• medical professionals; and
• other experts.

Accountability

But expertise creates a second question:

Who decides what government policy should be?

An expert may know more about a technical problem than a politician.

But expertise does not itself create democratic legitimacy.

This produces a fundamental tension:

Expertise favors institutional independence.

Democratic accountability favors presidential control.

Administrative law exists partly to manage this tension.

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20. Political Neutrality and Agency Independence

One traditional argument for independent agencies is political neutrality.

Suppose an agency regulates an industry that is politically important.

If the agency is completely controlled by the President, critics may argue that regulation could become excessively responsive to the administration’s short-term political interests.

An independent structure might theoretically encourage longer-term decision-making.

But complete political neutrality is difficult to achieve.

Agency officials are still:

• appointed through political processes;
• influenced by statutory mandates;
• affected by budgets;
• subject to congressional oversight;
• embedded in political institutions; and
• influenced by changing administrations and public priorities.

Independence is therefore better understood as institutional insulation, not complete political neutrality.

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21. Congressional Power and Agency Design

Congress plays a crucial role in designing administrative agencies.

Congress can determine:

• the agency’s jurisdiction;
• its statutory mission;
• its organizational structure;
• qualifications for office;
• appointment mechanisms;
• terms of office;
• procedures;
• funding arrangements;
• enforcement authority; and
• rulemaking authority.

But Congress’s design authority is subject to constitutional limits.

The central modern question is whether Congress has crossed the constitutional boundary by structuring an agency in a way that prevents the President from exercising constitutionally required executive control.

Trump v. Slaughter demonstrates that the Supreme Court is now prepared to scrutinize that boundary closely.

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22. The President and Agency Policy

The executive-agency model makes policy coordination easier.

A President can establish administration-wide priorities concerning matters such as:

• environmental regulation;
• labor enforcement;
• immigration;
• financial regulation;
• consumer protection;
• energy;
• transportation; and
• national security.

Executive agencies can generally be integrated into those priorities through presidential supervision.

Historically, independent agencies were intended to resist at least some degree of such direct policy control.

After Trump v. Slaughter, however, Congress cannot simply characterize an agency as “independent” and thereby remove executive power from presidential supervision.

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23. The President and Agency Removal

Removal is therefore central to the modern distinction.

Executive agency

The President generally possesses broad authority to remove executive officers.

Traditional independent agency

Congress historically attempted to restrict presidential removal through for-cause provisions.

Modern constitutional framework

After Trump v. Slaughter, statutory restrictions on presidential removal of officers exercising executive power face serious constitutional limits.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning was categorical in its treatment of executive power: officers exercising the President’s executive power must remain accountable to the President through the removal power.

This makes removal one of the most important issues in modern administrative structure.

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24. The Difference Between Statutory and Constitutional Independence

This distinction deserves special emphasis.

Statutory independence

Congress may use statutes to create institutional features intended to provide some degree of independence.

Examples may include:

• staggered terms;
• bipartisan requirements;
• specialized qualifications;
• organizational separation;
• procedural protections.

Constitutional independence

The much stronger question is whether the Constitution permits Congress to prevent the President from controlling officials exercising executive power.

After Trump v. Slaughter, the answer is generally negative where the officials exercise executive power.

Therefore:

An agency can have statutory characteristics associated with independence without possessing constitutionally unlimited independence from the President.

This is one of the most important distinctions in contemporary administrative law.

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25. A Practical Comparison

Question	Executive Agency	Traditional Independent Agency
Presidential supervision	Strong	Historically more limited
Leadership	Often single official or hierarchical structure	Often multimember board or commission
Removal	Traditionally broader presidential removal authority	Historically often for-cause
Political insulation	Lower	Traditionally higher
Expertise	Important	Often emphasized
Rulemaking	Yes	Yes
Enforcement	Yes	Yes
Adjudication	Sometimes	Sometimes
Congressional design	Extensive	Extensive
Judicial review	Available where authorized	Available where authorized
Constitutional status	Executive power subject to presidential control	Historically more insulated; constitutional basis substantially changed in 2026

The final row is the most important.

The traditional independent-agency model cannot simply be carried forward unchanged after Trump v. Slaughter.

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26. Why the Distinction Still Matters

If the Supreme Court has weakened the constitutional distinction, why should students continue learning it?

Because the distinction remains essential for understanding:

1. the history of administrative law;
2. agency structure;
3. presidential administration;
4. congressional design;
5. removal power;
6. separation of powers;
7. regulatory independence;
8. agency accountability; and
9. modern constitutional disputes.

Furthermore, even after Trump v. Slaughter, agencies can still possess different institutional characteristics.

The important change is that those characteristics cannot automatically be treated as a constitutional license to remove executive agencies from presidential supervision.

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27. A Simple Hypothetical

Imagine Congress creates two agencies.

Agency A

Congress gives the President authority to appoint and remove the agency’s director.

The agency regulates environmental standards.

The director reports to the President through the executive branch.

This looks like a conventional executive agency.

Agency B

Congress creates a five-member commission.

Members serve staggered terms.

Congress says they may be removed only for cause.

The commission regulates a major national industry.

Historically, Agency B would have been described as an independent agency.

But under modern constitutional analysis, the question does not end there.

A court would need to consider:

• What powers does the commission exercise?
• Are those powers executive?
• What does Article II require?
• Can Congress constitutionally restrict presidential removal?
• What remains of the traditional independent-agency doctrine after Trump v. Slaughter?

The agency’s label is therefore only the beginning of the analysis.

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28. Executive Control vs. Administrative Expertise

The deeper conflict can be expressed as a triangle:

Presidential accountability

↕️

Administrative expertise

↕️

Institutional independence

Each serves a legitimate governmental objective.

Too much presidential control can create concerns about politicization.

Too much institutional independence can create concerns about accountability.

Too little expertise can produce technically poor regulation.

Administrative law therefore has never been simply about choosing one side.

It is about determining how governmental power should be organized while remaining faithful to the Constitution.

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29. The Post-2026 Administrative State

The 2026 constitutional shift does not eliminate the administrative state.

Agencies remain necessary because Congress cannot itself administer every federal program, investigate every violation, develop every technical standard, or process every regulatory matter.

Cornell’s current overview similarly describes administrative agencies as institutions through which Congress’s statutory programs are implemented, administered, and enforced.

What changes is the constitutional architecture surrounding those agencies.

The modern administrative state must increasingly be understood through several principles:

• agencies exercise delegated authority;
• executive power is constitutionally connected to the President;
• presidential supervision matters;
• Congress remains responsible for statutory design;
• agencies remain subject to legal limits;
• courts independently interpret statutes;
• judicial review remains essential; and
• agency expertise does not replace constitutional or statutory authority.

This creates a more centralized conception of executive administration than the traditional independent-agency model suggested.

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30. Executive Agencies vs. Independent Agencies: The Essential Distinction

The easiest way to understand the distinction is to begin with the traditional model and then update it.

Traditional model

Executive agency

→ stronger presidential control

Independent agency

→ greater insulation from presidential control

Modern model

Agency exercising executive power

→ constitutionally connected to presidential supervision

Agency with institutional independence

→ may possess statutory or structural features of independence, but those features cannot necessarily prevent constitutionally required presidential control

That is the conceptual shift.

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is the difference between an executive agency and an independent agency?

Traditionally, executive agencies were subject to stronger presidential supervision, while independent agencies were designed with greater insulation from presidential control. The constitutional significance of that distinction has changed substantially after Trump v. Slaughter in 2026.

Are independent agencies still independent?

They may retain statutory or organizational characteristics associated with independence, but the Supreme Court has significantly limited Congress’s ability to insulate officers exercising executive power from presidential removal.

What is the most important difference between the two?

Historically, the most important difference was presidential control, particularly the President’s ability to remove agency officials.

Why is removal so important?

Removal allows the President to supervise officials exercising executive power. Without meaningful removal authority, presidential accountability may be weakened.

Did Trump v. Slaughter eliminate independent agencies?

No. It did not eliminate every agency that has historically been called independent. Rather, it held that the FTC’s statutory for-cause removal protection was unconstitutional and rejected the constitutional foundation of Humphrey’s Executor insofar as it permitted such insulation for officers exercising executive power.

What happened to Humphrey’s Executor?

The Supreme Court’s 2026 decision in Trump v. Slaughter overruled what remained of Humphrey’s Executor as a constitutional basis for insulating executive officers from presidential removal.

Does Congress have no control over executive agencies?

No. Congress creates agencies, defines their statutory authority, controls appropriations, establishes procedures, and exercises legislative oversight, subject to constitutional limitations.

Does presidential control mean agencies can ignore statutes?

No. Executive control does not authorize the President or an agency to exceed statutory authority.

Does Loper Bright affect this distinction?

Yes. Loper Bright reinforces the role of courts in independently interpreting statutes. Agency expertise does not give agencies automatic controlling authority over statutory meaning.

Can independent agencies still make regulations?

Yes. The existence of rulemaking authority does not itself determine whether an agency is executive or independent. The relevant questions concern the source of authority, institutional structure, and constitutional relationship to presidential control.

Why did Congress create independent agencies in the first place?

Historically, Congress sought greater insulation from direct presidential influence in areas where it valued expertise, continuity, stability, or reduced political interference.

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Key Takeaways

• Executive agencies traditionally operate under stronger presidential supervision.
• Independent agencies were historically designed to possess greater insulation from presidential control.
• The distinction has traditionally focused heavily on the presidential removal power.
• Humphrey’s Executor provided the classic constitutional foundation for independent-agency removal protection.
• Seila Law rejected the constitutionality of insulating a single director of a powerful executive agency from presidential removal.
• Free Enterprise Fund rejected excessive layers of removal protection.
• ** Trump v. Slaughter (2026) represents a major constitutional turning point.**
• The Supreme Court held that the FTC’s for-cause removal provision violated separation of powers.
• The Court substantially rejected the remaining constitutional foundation of Humphrey’s Executor.
• The modern question is therefore not simply whether an agency is called “independent.”
• The more important question is what governmental power the agency exercises and whether the Constitution permits Congress to insulate the officials exercising that power from presidential control.
• Statutory independence and constitutional independence are not necessarily the same.
• Executive agencies remain subject to statutes, constitutional limitations, administrative procedure, and judicial review.
• Independent agencies, even historically, were never above the law.
• The debate ultimately reflects a deeper conflict between presidential accountability, administrative expertise, and institutional independence.

Conclusion

The distinction between executive and independent agencies is one of the classic organizing concepts of American administrative law.

Historically, it represented a choice between two different models of government administration.

The executive model emphasized presidential supervision and democratic accountability.

The independent-agency model emphasized institutional insulation, expertise, continuity, and protection from immediate political pressure.

For much of the twentieth century, Humphrey’s Executor provided the constitutional foundation for the latter model.

But administrative law has changed.

Free Enterprise Fund restricted multiple layers of removal protection. Seila Law rejected the insulation of a single director exercising substantial executive power. And in ** Trump v. Slaughter (2026)**, the Supreme Court went much further, holding that Congress cannot use statutory removal protections to insulate officers exercising executive power from presidential control and overruling the remaining constitutional foundation of Humphrey’s Executor.

The result is a fundamental shift in how the administrative state should be understood.

The question is no longer simply:

“Is this an executive agency or an independent agency?”

The better constitutional question is:

“What governmental power is this agency exercising, who is constitutionally responsible for that power, and what degree of presidential control does the Constitution require?”

That question takes us directly to the next major subject in administrative law:

Agency Powers and Authority.